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ABSTRACT Eighteen years after the end of 2001 conflict between 
ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, North Macedonia remains 
a country deeply polarized along ethno-national lines with 
implications for the maintenance of peace. The peace-building 
policies introduced by the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) based 
on a consociational model of power-sharing have accommodated 
the demands of ethnic Albanians, including the right of access to 
higher education (HE) in the mother-tongue which represented one 
of the root-causes in the escalation of the 2001 conflict. The OFA’s 
exclusive focus on access and availability through state funding for 
higher education in the Albanian language has however favored a 
process of ethnicization of the tertiary sector. This paper seeks to 
investigate the unintended consequences of the OFA-induced ethnic 
self-ghettoisation within the public higher education system and, by 
the same token, it critiques the OFA’s lack of mechanisms to reach 
across the ethnic divide through the lenses of a rights-based 
approach to education. It ultimately argues that without a strong 
governmental commitment to deethnicize education by 
transcending the OFA’s intrinsic limits, power-sharing remains 
permeable to political manipulation which critically hampers social 
transformation and increases the probability of inter-ethnic tension, 
further weakening the peace process. 
KEYWORDS 
Higher education; education and peace-building; education and 
international development; North Macedonia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For many decades a low priority sector in the context of post-conflict humanitarian relief and 
development, higher education is gradually drawing attention from policy-makers, 
practitioners and researchers as a catalyst for economic and social recovery (World Bank, 
2000; Milton & Barakat, 2016; Millican 2018; Milton 2018). As a positional good providing 
“unparalleled access to the best paid and most rewarding forms of employment” (McCowan, 
2012, p. 117), quality higher education can play a pivotal role in increasing economic returns, 
strenghtening social mobility and status, and can potentially contribute to peacebuilding and 
social transformation by tackling horizontal inequalities that are often at the heart of inter-
ethnic conflicts due to significant disparities in access to the tertiary level; often resulting in 
elite stratification within distinct communities and exclusion of vulnerable groups from social 
and public life (Buckland, 2005; Millican 2018). Yet in war-affected and ethnically-divided 
societies, the role of universities for peacebuilding and conflict transformation largely depends 
on the appropriatness and long-term strategic vision of policies and programmes to ensure a 
positive impact on the dynamics of conflict (Milton, 2018). As Milton (2018) contends, 
"without a strategic approach to recovery" support to higher education can bring about "more 
harm than good" (p. 179).  
Through the lenses of a rights-based approach to education, this paper seeks to 
investigate the unintended consequences of the peace-building policies introduced by the 
ratification of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in North Macedonia almost two decades on 
from the end of the inter-community conflict bewteen ethnic Albanians and ethnic 
Macedonians. Based on a consociational model of power-sharing, the OFA accommodated the 
demands of ethnic Albanians, including the right of access to higher education (HE) in the 
mother-tongue which represented one of the root-causes in the escalation of the 2001 conflict 
(Czapliński, 2008). While it prevented an escalation of the conflict into a full scale civil war, it 
has been argued that the OFA had not only failed to introduce mechanisms geared towards 
building social cohesion but it had rather contributed to reinforcing ethno-cultural divisions 
along territorial and linguistic lines, resulting in the deepening of stereotypes, intolerance and 
lack of trust between the two dominant nations (Fontana, 2017; OFA Review on Social 
Cohesion, 2015; European Commission, 2018). 
In recent years, research has mostly focused on the consequences of educational 
decentralization at school level in North Macedonia. Both Lyon (2011, 2013) and Fontana 
(2017) have argued that the school system largely reflects the consociational structures and 
narratives of power along “mutually exclusive communities” reproducing pre-conflict 
cleavages and tensions (Fontana, 2017, p. 280). However, a comprehensive study on the 
unintended effects of higher education in the mother-tongue in North Macedonia has yet to 
appear. This is particularly pertinent given the prominent role of higher education in conflict 
causation and the strong focus on equality of access established by the OFA. The main 
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research question seeks to explore whether access to higher education in the mother-tongue 
has effectively functioned as a conduit for peace-building and/or whether a univocal focus on 
access and availability has perhaps served as a (political) tool to cement divisions and 
reproduce ethnic nationalism along the Yugoslav “separate but equal” policies. 
CURRENT STATE OF AN ETHNICALLY DIVIDED NATION 
On February 13, 2019, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia officially became North 
Macedonia (NM) putting an end to a decades-long dispute with neighboring Greece over the 
name row (The Economist, 2019, January 17). While observers contend that the deal will bring 
stability to a “region that still has pockets of uncertainty” (Erlanger, 2019, February 6), its 
ratification continues to trigger social unrest led by the Macedonian nationalist party, VMRO; 
which was removed from power in 2017 after a sustained political crisis resulting from 
revelations of corruption by the former Prime Minister (Marusic, 2017, May 22). A coalition 
Government comprised of the ethnic Albanian DUI and the left-wing Macedonian party, SDSM, 
took office in May 2017 (Marusic, 2017, May 31). This was in the aftermath of what analysts 
consider the most severe democratic setback since the 2001 conflict between Macedonian 
forces and the ethnic-Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA): On April 27, 2017, 200 
nationalists broke into the Parliament as a reaction to the election of the first Albanian 
speaker of the Assembly and the formation of the new ruling majority, perceived as a threat to 
the interests of ethnic Macedonians (European Commission, 2018, p. 7; The New York Times, 
2017, April 27); that is, the Macedonian-speaking Orthodox majority in the country that 
accounts to 64% of its 2.6 million population versus 25% represented by the Albanian-speaking 
Muslim community (State Statistical Office [SSO], 2002 Census).1 Most recently, ethnic 
tensions flared up during the course of a retrial against 33 ethnic Albanians accused to have 
been involved in a two-day shootout in June 2016 against Macedonian security forces. The 
defendants contend to have been the victims of a political set-up by the VMRO (Balkan Insight, 
2019, May 16).   
After almost two decades from the finalization of the Ohrid Framework Agreement 
(OFA), which ended the 2001 conflict by introducing a consociational democracy through 
territorial decentralization and extended rights for the Albanian-speaking minority, amid a 
deteriorating economy and high unemployment, especially amongst youth at 46% (EC, 2018), 
the political climate continues to be fraught with tensions between ethnic-based parties that 
find their raison d’être in the politicization of ethnonational cleavages (Terry, 2017; Fontana, 
2017) with implications for the country’s fragile inter-ethnic environment (EC, 2018). A 2008 
UNDP report indicates that 60% of Macedonians and 50% of Albanians respectively attribute 
the responsibility for fuelling ethnic tension to parties belonging to the opposing community 
                                                          
1Turks, Roma and Serbs represent smaller minorities. 
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(p. 63). The report also highlights that the two largest communities have different visions and 
sense of belonging to their country (p. 64).2 Civil society representatives have repeatedly 
warned against deepening polarization. As Kosturanova, Head of the Youth Educational 
Forum, maintains: “Macedonia is a deeply polarized society, where citizens are being divided 
based on their ethnicity, language, religion, gender, political views” (The New York Times, 
2017, June 1). The ethnic polarization encompasses all aspects of life: For instance, just 37% of 
Macedonians have professional relations with people from a different ethnic background. The 
percentage is slightly higher amongst Albanians. Social life is also polarized and media outlets 
are rigidly divided by languages (UNDP, 2008, pp. 60-61). The degree of ethnic separation is 
particularly striking amongst youth and, more specifically, in the education sector, including 
HE (EC, 2018; OFA Review, 2015). A 2009 UNICEF study highlights that in consociational North 
Macedonia a “model of parallelism and separation has been followed rather than a model of 
integration” (2009). The next section gives an overview of the language and education reforms 
as stipulated in the OFA as these continue to shape the inter-ethnic landscape with 
implications for the maintenance of peace. 
Education and Language Reforms in Consociational North Macedonia 
From 2005, the responsibility for a number of public services, imprimis basic education, had 
been entirely assigned to municipalities (Lyon, 2013) in accordance with the OFA which 
stipulated, inter alia, extended linguistic/cultural rights to persons belonging to non-majority 
communities, with an emphasis on access to education in the mother-tongue given the 
importance of education for conveying aspects of a group cultural identity (Bush & Saltarelli, 
2000). The OFA not only reiterated the right of access to primary and secondary education in 
the mother tongue, a provision of the Yugoslav “separate but equal” policies which “fixed and 
crystallized ethno-cultural nations and were deliberately constructed as belonging to 
particular ethno-cultural nations” (Brubaker, 1996, p. 4) but introduced a principle of positive 
discrimination in the enrolments of minorities in State universities and prescribed publicly 
funded access to higher education in the Albanian language, considered as key conflict drivers 
(Czapliński, 2008; Bacevic, 2014). The OFA also established Albanian as an official language in 
addition to Macedonian in areas where ethnic Albanians make up at least 20% of the 
population. In January 2019, a new law that extends the use of the Albanian language across 
the country has come into force despite the refusal by the President to sign it and the fierce 
opposition of the VMRO claiming its unconstitutionality (Marusic, 2019, January 18). Ethnic 
Albanians see this as the last remaining stipulation of the OFA although strong disagreements 
with the VMRO over the interpretation of the normative provision remains (OFA Review, 
2015). As Fontana (2017) argues, the education and language reforms have come to epitomize 
the new power relationship between ethnic Macedonians and the ethnic Albanian minority, 
                                                          
2The status of Kosovo is seen by ethnic Albanians in North Macedonia as their political priority. 
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who had been mobilizing for greater collective and political rights since the country gained 
independence from Belgrade in 1991 and embarked in a predominantly mono-ethnic project 
of state nation-building, essentially through the preeminence of the Macedonian language 
(Bacevic, 2014). 
While the introduction of a single official language is traditionally used as a nation-
building (and nation-maintenance) tool to guarantee national cohesion, reinforce participation 
in public life and, ultimately, as aprecondition to the integration of diverse groups (Deen & 
Romans, in Ulasiuk, 2018), there is always a risk that language can be employed as a means of 
domination to preserve the privileges of the majority group in society (Horowitz, 1985); 
resulting into a “nation-destroying process” (Walker, 1972) with the formation of antagonistic 
and profoundly resilient “minority nation-building” stances (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 233) that could 
work counter the exclusive state policies and lead to conflict and/or enduring tensions. This is 
because language constitutes one of the key “markers” of ethno-national identities and, by 
extension, not only any perceived threat to a particular language, both within and outside the 
education system, is construed as a threat to the survival of a group identity (Bush & Saltarelli, 
2000) but language symbolizes the “worth and status of the community that speaks it” 
(Horowitz, p. 219). As Horowitz explains, if “the demand for a single official language reflects 
the desire for a tangible demonstration of preeminence, so linguistic parity is transparent code 
for equality” (p. 220). And yet, the question is whether improved language access and 
(educational) decentralization correlate with improved integration and cohesion. This is 
because a focus on access alone as a quantitative indicator in the measurement of progress 
does not necessarily translate into a more cohesive society. Access to education alone, for 
instance, does not, per se, fulfill the right to education. The conditions in which education 
takes place, the quality of education as well as the capacity of educational institutions to 
prepare graduates for political, economic and social life are equally important categories 
(Tomaševski, 2001; McCowan, 2011). As a result of educational decentralization, UNICEF 
(2009) reports a decline by more than 10% of “mixed schools” (under whose roof children are 
still ethnically split by language or taught in different shifts/buildings) in the 2001-2009 period 
and an increase in the number of monolingual ones (p. 7). UNDP (2008) indicates a reluctance 
to send children to a mixed school amongst 69% of ethnic Macedonians and 42% of Albanians 
(p. 61). Higher education has also expanded dramatically in consociational North Macedonia: 
In 1994-1995, only 1.95% of graduates were ethnic Albanians against 19% in the 2014-2015 
period (Muhic & Memeti, 2016). The expansion, however, has occurred only along ethno-
cultural and territorial lines with newly founded Universities delivering instruction exclusively 
in Albanian or Macedonian. Arguably, if increased access to mother tongue-based education 
can help preserve cultural identities and settle ethnic grievances, it can also contribute to 
cementing boundaries between groups along ethno-national identities in the absence of inter-
communal points of contact and shared values (Preece, 2005); ultimately leaving little to no 
margin for “other ways of being and other forms of politics” (Finlay, in Fontana, 2017, p. 33) 
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other than identity politics. An OSCE study (2010) indicates a high level of adversity between 
Albanian and Macedonian students with nearly half of their school teachers appearing to have 
made derogatory remarks against the other community in their classroom. A review report on 
the implementation of the OFA (OFAR, 2015) takes stock of the increasing lack of cohesion, 
spreading of negative stereotypes, intolerance and mistrust between the two dominant 
nations. 
As Fontana (2017) contends, the emergence of a “parallel” education system can result 
in the development of a sense of belonging of one group against another (and even against 
the State) and education is often used in deeply divided societies as a “gatekeeping” tool by 
manipulative ethnic mobilisers to nurture exclusive identities and challenge the legitimacy of 
other groups’ discourses (p. 42). Higher education is not free from attacks and manipulations 
due to its relevant political role. As Milton (2018) claims, higher education is not only often 
perceived as a hotbed of political radicalism (i.e., through student activism, production of 
critiques against the status quo) but can become a “focal point” of ethnic mobilization (p. 90). 
The next section provides an account of the role played by HE in the escalation of the 2001 
conflict and how the HE landscape has changed since. The historical context vis-à-vis the 
current situation is deemed relevant to the scope of this paper. 
The Role of Higher Education in Conflict Causation  
Analysts argue that the problem of access to HE in the mother-tongue represented one of the 
main drivers in the process of ethnic mobilization during the ‘90s by ethnic Albanians 
(Czapliński, 2008; Bacevic, 2014). As Czapliński (2008) claims, citing the then OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Max van der Stoel, “He believed that the 
solution to the problem of Albanian language HE was a prerequisite for achieving progress in 
other aspects of minority rights and, after it had been addressed, it would be much easier to 
move on other issues” (p. 218). While mother tongue-based schooling was guaranteed by the 
Constitution, higher education  was exclusively delivered in Macedonian (Bacevic,2014). 
According to Czapliński (2008), the widespread inability to speak the state language and 
discriminatory practices on the grounds of ethnicity, resulted in great disparities in access to 
HE among ethnic Albanians in the ‘90s. This, in turn, hindered access to employment 
opportunities, representation in decision-making institutions and was perceived as a threat to 
Albanians’ longing to become a constituent nation.  
As Silva (1978) declares, in the context of multicultural societies, ethnic communities 
tend to measure the level of discrimination and equality on the number of university 
enrollments (in Milton, 2018). While some ethnic Albanians would pursue HE in Kosovo 
(Czapliński,2008), the banning of Albanian at the University of Prishtina in the ‘90s, as part of 
Milošević’s strategy to restrain Kosovo-Albanians’ mobilization for independence, put a stop to 
this trend (Kostovicova, 2005). This paved the way for the creation, in 1994, of the (illegal) 
Albanian-language University of Tetovo (UT), on the north Macedonian border with Kosovo 
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and epicenter of the 2001 conflict, perceived by the Government of Macedonia as a hotbed of 
ethnic Albanian separatism with links to the NLA (Czapliński, 2008). On the 17th of February, 
1995, to prevent the start of classes, Macedonian forces opened fire on students killing one 
(Ackerman, 1999). This ignited a spiral of inter-ethnic violence and prompted the direct 
involvement of the HCNM who sought to resolve the problem of access to HE in the Albanian 
language by proposing the establishment of a trilingual (Albanian, Macedonian and English) 
higher education provider in the town of Tetovo: South East European University (Czapliński, 
p. 88). Often referred to as a “peacekeeping university” (EUA, 2018, p. 4), South East European 
University (SEEU) was conceived as a key social agent in supporting peace-building and 
rapprochement efforts (Czapliński, 2008; Bacevic, 2014). In line with the newly adopted Law 
on HE (2000), which consented teaching in minority languages by private providers (Czapliński, 
2008), the SEEU project was accepted by all political camps in June 2000.3 However, the 
Kosovo crisis (1999) acted as a catalyst for renewed violence across Macedonia delaying the 
opening of SEEU until September 2001 in the aftermath of the OFA. As a 2004 OECD report 
indicates, 2303 ethnic Albanians enrolled in the first two years at SEEU, “thus, virtually at a 
stroke, the total current participation rate of Albanian students in higher education rose to 
9%” (p. 20). Ironically, while the SEEU proposal purported to guarantee access to HE in 
Albanian, the OFA “had created the conditions to pursue the old agenda of Albanian political 
parties” (Bacevic, 2014, p. 192) precisely by prescribing publicly funded access to higher 
education in the Albanian language. As a result, the University of Tetovo, located within a 
short walk from SEEU, was legalized in 2004. A decade later, another public Albanian-language 
institution, Mother Theresa University (MTU), was established.  
In recent years, research has mostly focused on the consequences of educational 
decentralization at school level in NM. Both Lyon (2011, 2013) and Fontana (2017) have 
argued that the school system largely reflects the consociational structures and narratives of 
power along “mutually exclusive communities” reproducing pre-conflict cleavages and 
tensions (Fontana, 2017, p. 280). However, a comprehensive study on the unintended effects 
of HE in the mother-tongue in NM has yet to appear. While often “neglected” (Milton) as a 
sector in development, recent research shows that HE can not only contribute to economic 
recovery after conflict but could play a role in peace-building and conflict transformation 
(Millican, 2018; Milton, 2018; Milton & Barakat, 2016). This is particularly the case for NM 
given the prominent role of HE in conflict causation and the strong focus on equality of access 
established by the OFA. However, the question is whether access to HE in the mother-tongue 
is per se conducive to sustain peace and/or whether a univocal focus on access has perhaps 
served as a (political) tool to cement divisions and reproduce ethnic nationalism along the 
Yugoslav “separate but equal” policies. 
                                                          
3In line with the HE Law (2000), SEEU was conceived as a private not-for-profit provider. Its status changed to private-public in 2008 
and currently receives 20% of its funding through the State. 
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      THE ETHNICIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION  
In line with the OFA, non-majority students have the right to study in their mother-tongue at 
all levels of education with the State language (Macedonian) being introduced at fourth grade. 
Data shows that 64,51% of pupils at primary level study in Macedonian, 32,17% in Albanian, 
and the rest in Turkish (3,05%) and Serbian (OFAR, 2015). For a total of 346 primary schools, 
247 are mono-lingual and the rest bilingual or trilingual (p. 171). Similarly, at secondary level, 
66, 89% of children learn in Macedonian, 29,26% in Albanian, 2,01% in Turkish and 0,26% in 
Serbian for a total of 103 schools. Although a quarter of schools (primary and secondary) are 
bilingual or trilingual, only 13% of these have students de facto studying under the same roof 
(Bakiu &  Dimitrova, 2016). This is because in the so-called ‘mixed schools’ pupils attend 
classes in detached buildings or different shifts with little to no interaction among different 
ethnic groups (ibid.). This is particularly relevant in the case of ethnic Macedonian and 
Albanian children who study in an ethnically mixed environment but rarely have contact with 
each other. According to the OSCE (2010), “one third of children (i.e., 30% Macedonian and 
35% Albanian) claim that they have mutual contact outside of the classroom environment and 
if they do is mostly not out of personal initiative” (p. 20). In a nutshell Macedonian and 
Albanian students study in their mother tongue and almost all Roma and Serbian students 
attend classes in Macedonian. While the majority of Turkish students study in Turkish, a large 
percentage of them follow instruction in Macedonian (UNICEF, 2009). Albanian students are 
therefore the most isolated with respect to other ethnic communities. However, the degree of 
ethnic separation is mostly pronounced at higher education level. This section addresses the 
peace-building implications of ethnic self-ghettoisation exclusively within the public HE system 
and challenges the OFA’s exclusive access-oriented policy in this regard. 
The country has five fully publicly funded universities that provide teaching 
predominantly in Macedonian, except for teacher training faculties where instruction in 
minority languages is consented (Law on HE, 2008, art. 103), or Albanian; as the law requires 
taking Macedonian as a separate subject in addition to two other courses delivered in the 
state language within Albanian-language institutions (art. 103). A look at graduate rates, 
disaggregated by ethnicity, from public HE institutions, provides an idea of the level of 
“voluntary self-segregation” (Lijphart, in Fontana, 2018, p. 33): In 2017, the number of ethnic 
Albanians that graduated from the three largest public Macedonian-language institutions, that 
is, the University of Skopje (UKIM), Bitola and Shtip, represented respectively 7,4% (of which 
60% studied at the Faculties of Philology/Pedagogy which deliver instruction in Albanian), 1,6% 
and 0,58% compared to 85,19%, 91,7% and 94% of ethnic Macedonians against the total 
number of graduates which includes other smaller minorities (SSO, 2019). Although there is no 
data available for the newly established Mother Theresa University, ethnic Macedonians that 
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completed their studies at the University of Tetovo in 2017 represented 4,3%4 of its total 
graduates against 82,66% comprised of ethnic Albanians. Considering the predominantly 
Albanian-inhabited region of Tetovo, SEEU, a private-public provider,  represents a significant 
exception in terms of ethnic heterogeneity: In 2017, 67,84% of its graduates were ethnic 
Albanians vis-à-vis 14,50% of ethnic Macedonians with a remaining 17,66% comprised of 
Turks, Roma, Serbs and Albanian-language students from neighboring countries, mainly 
Albania and Kosovo (SSO, 2019). Clearly, while HE for ethnic Albanians is both publicly 
available and accessible, the question is whether graduates from ethnic universities are being 
prepared for social, political and economic participation and, most importantly, if this leads to 
improved social cohesion. As noted, despite an exponential increase in the number of 
enrollments amongst ethnic Albanians, signaling a consistent demand for HE and political 
commitment to fulfill it (Fontana, 2017), the institutional “ethnicization” of higher education 
risks reinforcing ethnic identities and further divisions between groups. Besides, while 
evidence shows that an increase in HE enrollments amongst minorities can lower the chances 
of a relapse into conflict, the creation of a “youth bulge” with no employment prospects 
and/or perceived employment/income inequalities can generate new grievances and lead to 
inter-ethnic tension (Milton, 2018, pp. 94-95). In this regard, the OFAR (2015) indicates that 
ethnic Albanians are still under-represented within both “budgetary institutions” and the 
public sector (pp. 19-20). Terry (2017) contends that the “Macedonia’s ethnic-political system 
has resulted in many jobs being restricted to ruling party elites and loyalists, who have 
predominantly been ethnic Macedonians” (p. 73). Terry further maintains that the lack of 
connections with the parties in power constitute a barrier for minorities. Albanians also 
continue to earn less than Macedonians with a monthly average of 165 versus 350 Euros (pp. 
73-74). The necessity to bridge the ethnic divide should therefore be regarded as a national 
priority.  
While “structural diversity” does not necessarily translate into the development of 
meaningful contact with the other (Allport, 1979, p. 276; Gurin, Dey & Hurtado, 2002), it is a 
prerequisite to create opportunities for interaction that could, if well administered by relevant 
institutions, foster mutual understanding and acceptance (Allport,1979, Feuer, Hornidge & 
Schetter, 2013). In short, “contact is good, and the more of it the better” (Hughes, in Fontana, 
2018, p. 230). Kymlicka (1995) argues that multination states must ensure that its citizens 
respect diversity as much as the “particular ethnic groups and national cultures with whom 
they currently share the country” in order to guarantee stability (p. 191). The North 
Macedonian education system, however, seems to support existing segmental cleavages by 
defying the “practices of recognition of difference” (Jenson, 1998, p. 16) which educational 
institutions, including HE, should implement through the promotion of a sense of belonging 
                                                          
4This 4% could be represented by Muslim Macedonians or Torbeši, a community in the Tetovo region fluent in Macedonian, 
Albanian and Turkish (Dikici, 2008). 
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based on inclusion and shared beliefs. A commitment to the values of diversity as part of 
identity formation processes in deeply divided societies is especially relevant at HE level, in the 
years between adolescence and adulthood, that is, when youngsters’ “sense of personal and 
social identity is formed” on the basis of similarities with and differences from their peers 
(Gurin et al, 2002, pp. 334-335). As Gurin et al (2002) maintain, the experience of diversity is 
particularly influential and thus conducive to the formation of inclusive identities when the 
social background of higher education substantially differs from students’ community and 
house environments. In addition, as McCowan (2012) contends, besides its “positional and 
instrumental benefits” (p. 117), HE has the potential to play a role in “developing criticality” (p. 
118). That is, in building the capacity for independent thinking which feeds into a better 
understanding of oneself and the Other by challenging “established truths and decode and 
resist the messages of power-holders and violent ideologues” (Schendel, in Millican, 2018, p. 
50).  
In this sense, universities could be uniquely positioned to support peace-building 
processes as traditionally heterogeneous spaces of civic socialization and through their 
intrinsic role in fostering independent thinking since the subject-specific curriculum would 
represent, with the exception of specific courses (e.g., peace education), a less viable avenue 
to promote tolerance (Feuer et al, 2013). As Milton and Barakat (2016) put it, while primary 
education is essentially formative, “higher education has the possibility to be transformative” 
(p. 414). However, higher education can also operate counter conflict transformation by 
strengthening the social roots of conflict through, for instance, the presence of negative ethnic 
stereotypes in textbooks or the attitude of faculty members geared towards the exclusion or 
belittlement of minorities. The employment of teacher-centered pedagogies and rote-learning 
methodologies that stifle students’ initiative and creativity can also undermine peace-building 
efforts by making students more vulnerable to political manipulation (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; 
Milton, 2018). The lack of opportunities to engage with diversity on campus also affects the 
quality of the educational experience while inhibiting the chances to “mediate the identity 
bases of conflict” (Milton & Barakat, 2017, p. 415). In the context of Macedonia, as Muhic 
(2017) contends, “universities can be an important channel through which to promote social 
cohesion (. . .) Thus, if education policy is not sensitive to the issue of social cohesion and does 
not incorporate the perspectives of a variety of communities, it can divide and alienate non-
majority communities” (p. 21). In this regard, recent reports by the European University 
Association address the need to enhance student-centered learning across all Macedonian 
public monolingual institutions and strengthen higher order thinking and life skills to promote 
students’ critical and communicative abilities (EUA: 2017a, p. 17; 2017b, p. 21; 2017c, pp. 20-
21; 2017d, pp. 17-18). The ethnicization of higher education represents, nevertheless, a 
dangerous element of the “hidden curriculum” (Apple, 2004) by undermining students’ ability 
to develop a critical perspective on society while strengthening prejudices and encouraging 
identity politics. As Allport (1979) claims, “segregation markedly enhances the visibility of a 
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group; it makes it seem larger and more menacing that it is” (p. 269).5 
Although diversity could be experienced through specific curricular content, evidence 
suggests that without a direct exchange of ideas with the Other, this could even have negative 
effects on students’ development (Gurin et al, 2002). Muhic and Memeti (2016) claim that 
while North Macedonia's  public higher education  providers offer courses in multiculturalism, 
delivered as electives mainly across pedagogical faculties, the lack of cultural competence 
among faculty is worrisome. As Muhic (2017) maintains, whenever faculty incorporate topics 
about diversity in their subjects, they do so in an “unstructured and non-critical way” which 
could result in reinforcing existing stereotypes by “trivializing” ethnic cultures (p. 22). 
Significantly, ethnic prejudice seems most prominent amongst students from ethnically 
homogeneous campuses (Muhic & Memeti, 2016). The lack of heterogeneity among staff 
within ethnic universities (Muhic, 2007) and the absence of any kind of cooperation with 
providers from the ‘opposing’ community  (OFAR, 2015) ultimately characterize North 
Macedonia's  public higher education  institutions as ethnic cloisters and incubators of 
“national identity-based projects” (Bacevic, p. 192) that could hamper conflict transformation 
by acting as “perpetrators of conflictual identities” (Milton & Barakat, 2016, p. 414) rather 
than promoters of mutual ones based on shared fundamental values (i.e., respect for the rule 
of law, tolerance, common vision/sense of belonging).  
The OFA’s “just” vision of multicultural North Macedonia: A path to national dis-integration?   
The issue with the OFA’s “just” vision of the North Macedonian society”, to use Kymlicka’s 
terminology (2002, p. 16), based on consociational power-sharing, is simply that it does not 
encourage integration (Bacevic, 2014). With regard to education, for instance, to recall 
Tomaševski, an exclusive focus on availability/access does not fulfill the right of education 
which must take into account the importance of quality, including the conditions in which 
education is delivered, and the ability of institutions to adapt to changing social circumstances. 
Critics of the OFA and, by extension, consociationalism, argue that while it contributed to 
prevent a worsening of the conflict and secure peace, at least in the short term, it has 
achieved that at the expenses of inter-ethnic cohesion (Lyon, 2015) as it basically relies on the 
“division it is supposed to solve” (McGarry & O’Leary, in Fontana, 2018, p. 37). As Fontana 
(2016) contends, if (educational) decentralization can contribute to “conferring legitimacy to a 
peace process by eroding inequalities and promote social mobility” while ensuring the 
protection of distinctive identity markers, mother-tongue education can also weaken conflict 
transformation by “isolating communities” (p. 859) and limit their “access to equal 
participation in society” (Freedland & Patrick, 2004, p. 1); especially in the absence of 
mechanisms to bridge the inter-ethnic gap - which the OFA had essentially failed to establish 
while substantiating and thus strengthening the Yugoslav “separate but equal” policies,- and 
                                                          
5Ethnic divisions have had a profound impact on the collapse of Yugoslavia and regional conflicts (Hammel, 2010). 
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where there is a perceived opposition to the state language. In 2007, the ethnic Albanian 
Minister of Education, introduced English from first grade while deferring the study of 
Macedonian, in which Albanians still struggle to express themselves, from first to fourth grade 
(in Fontana, 2017, p. 211). This controversial shift is symptomatic of the degree of political 
instrumentalization with repercussions on education which remains at risk of political 
influence (EU, 2018). It could also be argued that since North Macedonia's accession into the 
EU is evaluated on the basis of the implementation of the OFA, there is fertile ground for 
political manipulation.6 This is because lawmakers may be “contented when they have strictly 
followed the rules that a limited interpretation of the rights impose on them” (Robeyns, 2006, 
p. 78) fulfilling, perhaps, a hidden political objective aiming at separation rather than 
integration. Robeyns maintains that governments are, in some cases, “part of the problem, 
rather than part of the solution” (p. 77). In this regard, Lyon (2015) warns of the influence of 
North Macedonian municipal officials who contribute to mobilize local ethnic identities around 
the idea that mixing in educational institutions is not safe in order to secure electoral 
consensus (p. 107). According to Fontana (2017), the failure of the MoE’s Strategy for 
Integrated Education (2010), formulated to address the fragmentation of the education 
system, was essentially due to a lack of political will on both sides.  
Arguably, if the right of access to HE in Albanian contributed to ending the 2001 conflict, 
the presence of ghettoized campuses and lack of instruments to promote rapprochement, 
undermines the significance of what Robeyns (2006) terms “the personal and collective 
instrumental social roles of education” (p. 74) and, in turn, the possibility of engineering a 
social change. As Tomaševski (2003) explains, “education should prepare learners for 
parenthood and political participation, it should enhance social cohesion and, more than 
anything, it should teach the young that all human beings - themselves included - have rights” 
(p. 33). This is because a right cannot be fulfilled without the “active, meaningful and critical 
participation” (Coysh, 2014, p. 109) of rights-holders. A “rights-based approach to 
development” (RBAD) relies on mutual responsibilities between those accountable to protect 
and promote people’s rights (duty-bearers) and rights-holders as key agents in the process of 
social change. However, if the fulfillment of a right arguably constitutes the goal of a RBAD, 
“the quality, legitimacy and sustainability of the outcome depends on the process used to 
achieve it” (Gready and Ensor, 2005, pp. 9-10). A ‘myopic’ interpretation of the OFA’s rights-
based educational policies, exclusively based on access/availability, which has essentially failed 
in creating an intercultural environment based on shared civic values and intellectual 
autonomy, could therefore hinder the setting in motion of the process itself precisely as it 
does not only confines communities to an “imposed locality” (Roter & Busch, in Ulasiuk, 2018, 
p. 175) but constrains individuals within fixed group identities which limit and/or influence 
their right to freely express their views or make decisions for themselves with serious 
                                                          
6See Art. 8e of the EU Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992). 
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implications for the future of democracy. A failure to fully comprehend educational rights, “in 
conjunction with other rights” (i.e., civil, political, economic; McCowan, 2011, pp. 290-291; 
Tomaševski, 2001), therefore makes education no longer a “key empowerment right” 
(Coomans, 2007, p. 184) or “a good thing” (Robeyns, 2006, p. 75). 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to analyze the unintended consequences of higher education in the 
mother-tongue in consociational North Macedonia given the prominent role of the tertiary 
sector in conflict causation and the strong focus on equality of access established by the OFA. 
Arguably, while the 2001 conflict has certainly served as a catalyst for pre-existing ethnic and 
cultural divisions which, as Baumann (2009) argues, “continue to shape the post-war society” 
(p.110), the peace-building policies introduced by the OFA clearly fall short in providing any 
recommendations on how to foster ethnic rapprochement and ensure social cohesion. One 
might even contend that the OFA has failed in securing a permanent state of ‘peace’ for as 
long as the presence of “negative, endogenous structures are left over as virulent factors, the 
danger of society’s return to violence is eminent” (Baumann, p.112). In conclusion, without a 
strong governmental commitment to deethnicizes education by transcending the OFA’s 
exclusive access-oriented policies, the persistence of a situation of “voluntary apartheid” 
(Baumann, p. 112) makes consociational power-sharing permeable to political manipulation 
which critically hampers social transformation and increases the probability of inter-ethnic 
tension, ultimately weakening the peace process. 
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